Abstract-This paper presents a survey on several RFID authentication protocols under low cost limitation. Different approaches under low cost restriction have been proposed by several protocols in order to satisfy security and privacy of RFID. In this survey all protocols are examined according to three aspects, namely data protection, tracking prevention, and forward security. Finally, it is conclude that there is no single protocol capable to fully satisfy the three security and privacy aspects and that they offer different level of low cost security and privacy protections.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is one of the emerging technologies in recent decades. The major purpose of RFID technology is to simplify automatic identification of objects with electromagnetic fields. It basically consists of transponders (tags), readers (scanners) and database application systems for further processing of the acquired data.
In general, RFID tags can be divided into two categories, active and passive. While active tags require a power source, passive ones does not rely on power source. This paper interests on passive tags because the tags do not require batteries or maintenance. In addition, they also have an indefinite operational life and are small enough to fit into a practical adhesive label.
Generally, RFID systems consist of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags and RFID readers. While RF tags operate as transponders, RF readers act as transceivers. In case of a more complex application, a database server is required to store information comes from both transponders and receivers sides [12] . The transmission range of RFID tags depend on different parameters and ranges from a few centimeters to several meters in practical applications.
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The following figure shows the RFID communication model. The communication is (depending on the tag protocol) initiated by the RFID reader (-reader talks first‖) or by the RFID tag (-tag talks first‖). Then it returns the reply to the database server. After identification and authentication on server side, then server will return the information of RFID tag to the reader. Bandwidth for RFID communication systems is relatively low in several kBit per second compared to other wireless technologies. However, recent modes offer higher data rates due to only small data is exchanged with a single tag. The bandwidth is more appropriate to perform scanning to all tags in the operation range of a reader within a short time [23] .
Recently, low-cost tags have been implemented in logistics, point-of-sale checkouts, animal identification, item management in libraries, and waste management. In addition, more sophisticated RFID tags (approx. 10 cents to 1 EUR) are used for higher value items in more complex applications such as ticketing, road toll, health care, electronic purse, key, access control for various facilities, anti-theft device and protection against counterfeiting. It is confirmed in [23] that these RFID tags have the capability to replace magnetic stripe cards and classical contact smartcards. Therefore, RFID is predicted to be applied in many more areas such as aviation, transportation, construction, clothing, health, and military.
However, RFID has serious drawbacks in order to be applied widely. Cost and security are considered as two primary concerns for future adoption of RFID. One of the issue of RFID is low cost which is considered still a bit higher than traditional bar code systems. Another concern is RFID tags are vulnerable to various attacks which leads to privacy problems.
Therefore, many researchers are challenged to improve RFID security by finding appropriate authentication mechanism while keep guarantee the low cost of RFID tags.
This study compares several low cost RFID authentication protocols in terms of its features and limitations. Then, in the next section, we will briefly review several RFID attacks. Subsequently, several low cost RFID authentication protocols will be presented in Sections 3. In Section 4, we propose our comparative study of the protocols. Finally, some conclusions will be provided in the last section.
II. RFID ATTACKS
RFID has received many attentions from not only business, technologists and researchers, but also journalists and privacy advocates in terms of several attacks that possibly suffer RFID users' privacy and security. In [4] [12] , it is widely argued how security and privacy issues are considered as the fundamental issue the RFID technology.
This chapter specifically deals with several RFID attacks, in order to understand the security and privacy issues.
We classify RFID security threats based location where the attacks occur, namely threats on the air interface, reader, and systems.
Attacks on the Interface
A. Eavesdropping This is one of the most basic threats to RFID systems. In this case, eavesdroppers could impersonate a target tag without knowing the tag's internal secrets. The eavesdropped information could for example be used to collect privacy sensitive information about a person [12] [13] .
B. Jamming Jamming means a deliberate attempt to disturb the air interface between reader and tag and thereby attacking the integrity or the availability of the communication. This could be achieved by powerful transmitters at a large distance, but also through more passive means such as shielding. As the air interface is not very robust, even simple passive measures can be very effective [14] .
C. Relay Attack A relay attack [15] for contactless cards is similar to the well known man-in-the-middle attack. In this type of attack, attacker sits in the middle of two ways communications and receives data from with both the reader and the victim's card. It is proven that this kind of attack also able to collect sensitive information of the RFID users.
D. Replay Attack In contrast to relay attack, in replay attack an attacker reuses communications from previous sessions to perform a successful authentication between a tag and a server. If a valid RFID signal can be intercepted and the data is recorded, this data can later be retransmitted to the reader. Because the data appears valid, the system accepts it and therefore users' information can be gained inappropriately [16] .
Attacks on the Readers
A. Physical Attack This is probably the most traditional attack of any kind of technology including RFID. Physical attack may lead to denial of service attack if the RFID tags are removed or broken. Unauthorized person could remove tags or put in foillined booster bag that will block RFID reader's request and temporarily deactivate the tag.
B. Falsifying reader ID In a secure RFID system the reader must authenticate to the tag. Illegal reader may falsify reader ID by faking the -identity‖ of an authorized reader. In this case, an attacker able to read the data with his own reader, although such an attack can be "very easy" to "practically impossible" to carry out which is depending on the security measures in place.
Attacks on the Systems
A. Flooding This kind of attack is performed against the database systems of RFID. If it is flooded with useless data then it will lead to denial of service attack. An attacker could attach RFID on other items causing RFID system to record useless data which will flood an RFID system with more data then it can handle.
B. RFID exploits Just like other software, RFID systems are vulnerable to buffer overflows, code insertion and SQL injection.
C. RFID worms and Viruses A worm is basically an RFID exploit that downloads and executes remote malwares. A worm could propagate through the network or through tags. Similarly, an RFID virus starts with malicious content of a tag. When the tag is read out, this initiates a malicious SQL query which may disturb the database in the back office. This type of attack already has been demonstrated (Juels 2006) .
III. PROTOCOLS IN LOW-COST RFID ENVIRONMENT
There are several protocols have been introduced in order to answer RFID security and privacy problems in the past decade. However, increasing security and privacy mechanism usually leads to increase of RFID tag cost. This is considered as a challenging task where the protocol should provides strong RFID authentication mechanism within the low cost limitation. Low cost RFID tags are very limited devices with very constrained (less than 1K logic gates to security related tasks) computationally.
Based on literature review, there are eleven protocols that strictly consider low cost boundaries while offering robust security and privacy mechanism in various ways.
The following are several low cost RFID authentication protocols that will be discussed deeper in the next section. One Time Password introduced by Juels, et.al [2] with a simple XOR operation, External Re-Encryption as proposed in [4] which utilize simple public key cryptosystem, Hashbased Authentication developed by Ohkubo et al. [7] , Blocker Tag as a simple RFID tag blocking mechanism offered in [3] , Extended Hash-lock by Weis et al. [8] , Hash-based Varying Identifier as another protocol with hash function proposed in [5] , Improved Hash-based Varying Identifier as proposed in [9] which focus on preventing -man in the middle‖ attack under low cost RFID circumstances, Mutual Authentication protocols as presented in [10, 11, 28] , and finally Ultra Lightweight method which was introduced by Peris-Lopez. [24, 26, 27] .
IV. SURVEY OF THE LOW-COST RFID AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
In this section, we perform comparative study on the aboved authentication protocols in terms of three main security and privacy features namely data protection, tracking prevention, and forward security.
Data protection in this approach simply does not mean confidentiality but imply data privacy of tag bearers. While tracking prevention refers to protection location privacy of tag bearers, forward security means ability to preserve history even after the secrets or keys have been exposed.
One-time Pad based on XOR
This method is proposed by Juels, at.al in 2003 [2] . It requires a very simple XOR operation, therefore low computational cost for RFID is satisfied. A reader (or a backend server) has the common list of randomly generated key for each tag. The reader and the tag find that both of them have the same key of the key list with several message exchanges between them. Then, the tag transmits its ID to the reader. However, this method needs several message exchanges for authentication between the tag and the reader. Besides, the common key list must be refreshed to guarantee the security. Although it seems provide appropriate tracking protection, it could not satisfy data privacy protection. Another limitation is that the protocol does not provide forward security. These are problems for implementation and system efficiency.
External Re-Encryption Scheme
External Re-Encryption Scheme is proposed in [14] . This method is aimed at protecting RFID security by using public key cryptosystem. This scheme is considered as a low cost protocol since it only utilizes two main mechanisms to authenticate RFID communications.
First, tag data is re-encrypted when a user requires using the data transferred from an external unit. As public key encryption needs high computation cost, a tag cannot process for itself. Thus, this job is generally processed by a reader. Second, each tag data is randomly shown until next session, the attacker eavesdrop the tag data cannot trace the tag for long-term period therefore, data privacy protection is guaranteed.
However, this method has limitations to frequently refresh each tag's data since the encrypted ID stored on tag is constant so that user location privacy is compromised. Therefore, it does not fully protect users' privacy. In addition, forward security is not covered by this protocol.
Hash Chain-based Scheme
Ohkubo et al. [7] proposed a hash-based authentication protocol. The aim of the protocol is to provide better protection of user privacy with the basic concept of refreshing the identifier of the tag each time it is queried by a reader. The protocol changes RFID identities on each read based on hash chains. Hash chain method is used in this two ways communication of RFID tag. Although this protocol does not require a random number generator, it seems satisfy data protection of RFID tags as well as provides adequate tracking prevention. However, this protocol is flawed to certain replay attacks which makes it difficult to guarantee forward security.
Blocker Tag
This protocol is introduced by Juels, et.al. [3] . The approach uses an individual tag, namely blocker tag for each tag and according to its purpose. To protect a tag's data, the blocker tag responses for attacker's request to get the tag's data. The response from the blocker tag is not for the tag but all tags. Thus, the attacker cannot distinguish the tag's data. This method basically uses binary tree walking protocol as a collision-avoidance mechanism.
Using the binary tree-based protocol, this method has advantages that the range of protecting tags can be efficiently specified into specific area of the binary tree [3] . Doing so, the area of protecting tags is divided into multiple privacy zones and the performance of tree walking can be efficient. This method also provides zone policy to apply protection policy according to various purposes. This method is currently considered as a practical solution for the existing RFID privacy and security protection by adequately maintain tracking prevention and forward security. Problem is that additional blocker tag is needed for every tag and it is susceptible whether tag bearers strictly follow to attach the additional tag which could pose user privacy.
Extended Hash-lock Scheme
The next RFID protocol with low cost constraint is called Extended Hash-lock. It is an authentication scheme introduced by Weis [8] in 2003. It was actually developed in two types, namely hash-lock and extended hash-lock schemes. However, the last name is widely used to identify this unique protocol. Both protocols employed different ways of hash functions.
Hash-lock scheme uses a back-end server to store keys k in its database for all tags. Each tag unique key with metaID = h(k) as its key. The tag transmits metaID as a response to a reader's query to the tag. Unfortunately, this protocol fails to overcome eavesdrop attacks since metaID is always constant which opens tracing problem. Therefore, location privacy of tag bearers is compromised.
On the other hand, extended hash lock protocol [8] provides a unique method to overcome the tracing problem. In this scheme, they introduced a tag with random number generator to randomize metaID value. The tag picks pseudo random number r uniformly and calculates c = hash(IDjjr) as the tag's unique identification for every session. The tag transmits its c and r to a back-end server by way of the reader. The server sends the unique identifier of the tag comparing c with the construction of r and all IDs that is stored in database of the server, then the server authenticates itself by sending the unique identifier, ID back to the tag.
Although this scheme provides strong authentication and prevents from the replay attacks, the tag can be traced if the tag's ID is exposed. In addition, an adversary can query a tag to get a tag's valid message pair (c; r). Later on, the attacker can impersonate that tag to a legitimate reader. As a result, it is proved that the protocol could not fully satisfy data protection and forward security issues.
Hash-based Varying Identifier
Another hash-based approach is hash-based varying identifier proposed by Henrici and Muller [5] . Their scheme also adopts a hash function and a random number generator, but a pseudo random number is generated by a back-end server and transmitted to the tag for every interrogation to make the tag's queried identifier random and preserve location privacy.
The overall system architecture of this protocol is quite similar to that of other previous works. In server side, DataBase-ID is exist and is set according to the database which will be in charge of the tag and ID, TID and LST of a tag. These are set to a random value initially. A corresponding row in the database ID, TID and LST is similar to the tag. Then HID is set to h(ID) and is used as a primary index. The database manages a pair of record to guarantee message recovery for any data loss using AE fields which pointing each other.
This protocol basically focuses on securing location privacy problems by making a tag's ID randomized in every interrogation. However, location privacy of tag bearers is compromised since the response of tag is constant until the next authentication session. Therefore, attackers able to track tag bearers whose tags are long-distance from readers and scarcely have chance to be queried.
Yet, by employing TIDs, the replay attacks cannot compromise the scheme since tags and back-end servers are mutually authenticated in every single interrogation. Errors in message transfer can be detected and the scheme is reliable for data loss since it can provide the data from the previous record. In short, forward security is not well provided.
Improved Hash-based Varying Identifier
Hwang et al. [9] proposed an improved authentication protocol of hash-based varying identifier. The main difference between this protocol and the previous ones is that a reader utilizes what is called a random number generator (RNG) to protect the man-in-the-middle attack. The following graph shows the overall protocol of Improved Hash-based Varying Identifier.
In every query, the reader sends a pseudo-random number, S, to the tag. Then the tag replies h(ID) for finding the record of a back-end server and half of a new identifier, hal fL (R) (R = h(ID||S). Then, the reader forwards h(ID), hal fL (R), and S. At the back-end server, h(ID) is used to find the corresponding record and ID is obtained for authentication process. With stored ID and S received from the reader, the back-end server can calculate R' = ID||S and also the tag can be authenticated by comparing hal fL (R') with the value of hal fL (R) from the tag. If the authentication is successful, then the remaining job is updating ID of the record to a new ID = R' and h(ID) to h(R0), and then updating AE fields of the pair of record to reference each other. Then, the back-end server replies hal fL (R) with tag data to the tag by way of the reader. With halfR(R), the tag can check whether the reply message is valid or not. If the process is successful, the tag and the back-end database updates its ID  ID  (R||R) since they assume the hash function of this protocol is h : {0; 1}*  {0; 1} 0.5L and R generated by this hash function is 0.5L bits.
Unlike previous protocols, this one changes the location of a R.N.G. from a back-end server to a reader as a new model. As a result, this scheme needs only 1l-field for a unique ID and its challenge and response phase uses a half length of R (R = h(ID||S)) so that its communication performance is more efficient than [7] . The scheme protects the location privacy as a tag's unique identifier is changed in every read attempts. The replay attacks cannot compromise the scheme since tags and back-end servers are mutually authenticated.
However, this scheme is still vulnerable to the man-in-themiddle attack particularly if there is no guarantee that the reader is a trusted party.
Mutual Authentication
In [10] Han et al. proposed a new mutual authentication protocol for RFID tags. The RFID reader and tag carry out the authentication based on their synchronized secret information. The synchronized secret information is monitored by a component of the database server. Although, this protocol is claimed satisfies the low-cost requirement of RFID tags, it's highly dependable on back-end database is confirmed as a serious limitation [11] .
Highly relying on database server is criticized in [28] . In reality, connection between the RFID reader and the central database do not always available thus fully relying on a central database means creating a single point of failure, opening up the entire RFID system to denial of service attacks [28] .
In addition, two types RFID mutual authentication protocols both without database server was proposed. The first protocol performs challenge and response before sending the tag secret to the reader, whilst in the second version the tag secret is sent in such a way that only an authenticated reader can decrypt it.
This work is then improved in [11] which enable the removal of reliable consistent connections between RFID readers with their database server without the timestamps.
The protocol enables not only RFID tag to authenticate RFID reader but also the latter to authenticate RFID tag. It is confirmed that the protocol satisfy the requirement of both data protection and tracking prevention [11] . However, we found that it does not fully guarantee forward security.
Ultra Lightweight
While various hash formulas are usually applied to increase RFID security, ultra-lightweight security proposed by Lopez et.al [24] , [26] , [27] maintain security and privacy of RFID using simple operation. They introduced three protocols namely, Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol (LMAP) [24] and Minimalist Mutual-Authentication Protocol (M2AP) [26] and Efficient Mutual Authentication Protocol (EMAP) [27] . Instead of using advanced hash formula, they use XOR, OR, AND, mod 2m.. In general, the protocols use a 480 EEPROM and a 96-bit key divided into 4 parts updates after each message cycle. Preventing users from privacy location tracking and re-transmission attacks is the key feature of the protocols [24] , [26] , [27] .
LMAP protocol uses only 300 gates to provide security, the 96 bit key is divided into 4, which produce 4 messages, by which the reader sends A, B, C messages to the tag. To provide authentication, the tag replies with a D message, in accordance with messages A, B, and C [24] . However, there are risks of data forgery and fabrication during transfer [28] . If the final session is concluded irregularly, then the IDS and key values are not refreshed. This will expose identical values by which location tracking is possibly occurs.
Similar to LMAP, M2AP protocol also employs 300 gates. The only difference is that there is an additional E value to add more security in database authentication compare to LMAP method [26] . Though it is efficient providing that it uses some calculations for authentication, it was confirmed that it fails to provide strong integrity since it does not use hash formulas or encryption algorithms [28] . Therefore, there is a possibility to track user location when the final session is concluded irregularly and also the IDS and key values are not refreshed.
The last one is Efficient Mutual Authentication Protocol or EMAP. This method is considered as the most efficient method among ultra-lightweight protocols, since it only uses 150 gates to provide security of RFID [27] . In his method, the 4 keys, which have been divided from message E, produce the XOR algorithm sigma value (K1K2K3K4) by which provide a more accurate way of authentication. The 96 bit ID can be divided into two, resulting in the use of a 1~48 bit ID and a 49~96 bit ID, which results in the use of 2 identification values. By inputting the key value into the formula, the safety of the system is enhanced. This method is more effective than the two previously mentioned systems, and can provide security within close ranges. However, it can be exposed to 3rd party tapping, message fabrication, or forgery over long ranges [28] .
Although the method is quite unique and fit to low cost limitation, the three protocols also criticized in terms of several weaknesses. As confirmed by Li et.al [29] who reveal these weaknesses by arguing that the protocols are not robust since there is no guarantee that the tag really recognize whether the replying messages are indeed received and verified by a legitimate reader or not. They examine the protocols by conducting de-synchronization and full disclosure attacks [29] .
Likewise, they also proof how vulnerable these protocols from full Disclosure attacks. The attack is done by repeatedly running the incomplete protocol many times at the tag side. This action will make the tag expecting that a completion message from the reader to update its secret. If the attacker can discharge the tag in a brute force way immediately after it sends out the reply message, all the secret information in the tag can be extracted [29] . As a result,, ultra lightweight protocols also do not provide full protection for forward security and location tracking. The following There are several papers have surveyed RFID from different point of views. Such surveys will be very beneficial to readers not only to understand state of the art on RFID research but also to provide a foundation for future research in the field [30] . In this survey we argue that all protocols proposed different ways to improve security and privacy of RFID while keep low-cost restriction in mind. After assessing them from three security and privacy point of view, namely data protection, tracking prevention and forward security, the conclusion is as follows.
From tracking prevention perspective, we found that some of protocols [1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8] offer adequate solution for tag anonymity using different kind of cryptographic approaches such as hash, hash-chain, or random number generator, and ultra-lightweight, while the rest [2, 6, 9] apply simple techniques based on some characteristics of RFID interfaces such as RFID tag's command or tag singularization that partially satisfy tracking prevention requirements.
In terms of data protection, most protocols seem to pay serious attentions. Only three protocols [1, 4, 5] could not fully satisfy this aspect, while the rest [2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9] provide better data privacy protection as proved in previous literatures.
Finally, most protocols fail to provide appropriate forward security mechanism [1, 2, 3, 6, 7] . While others [5, 8, 9] only provide half and only single protocol [4] seems to have capability in this aspect.
